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ABSTRACT
Greenawalt, Katie R. M.S., Department of Economics, Wright State University, 2006. 
The Effects of Macroeconomic Conditions on Traffic Fatalities Across the United States.
This study uses state-level data to estimate the effects of macroeconomic conditions on 
traffic fatality rates. Data was averaged over a five year period (1999-2003) and 
regression analysis was used to estimate a model to explain the impact of unemployment 
rates and income on traffic fatalities per vehicle mile traveled across the 50 United States. 
Variables were also included to control for other factors that affect state fatality rates. 
These factors include per capita alcohol consumption, speed limits, the percentage of 
teenage drivers, the relative strength of teenage driving laws, and average state 
temperature. A dummy variable was also included for the state of Utah. The results of 
this study indicate that income, temperature, and the dummy variable for Utah are 
inversely related to traffic fatality rates. Alcohol consumption, speed limits, the 
percentage of teenage drivers, and the relative strength of teenage driving laws were 
found to be positively correlated with state traffic fatality rates.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the United States Department of Transportation, there were 42,636 
motor vehicle fatalities in the United States in 2004. Traffic fatalities vary considerably 
from state to state. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, in 
2004, Wyoming had the highest per capita rate of fatalities at 32.38 per 100,000 people, 
while Massachusetts had the lowest rate at 7.42 per 100,000 people.1 Massachusetts also 
had the lowest fatality rate per million vehicle miles traveled (0.0085290), while 
Mississippi had the highest fatality rate per million vehicle miles traveled (0.0241931).
Numerous studies have examined the impact of regulatory safety policies such 
as speed limits, DUI laws, seatbelt enforcement, and teen driving laws on traffic fatality 
rates across states.2 However, few cross-sectional studies examine the impact of 
macroeconomic factors, such as income and unemployment rates, on state traffic 
fatalities. Economic factors are likely to impact traffic fatalities because people will 
demand more safety, including public safety, at higher income levels. The purpose of 
this study is to estimate the cross-sectional relationship between economic conditions and 
traffic fatalities among states.
Several economic studies have analyzed the relationship between macroeconomic 
factors and traffic fatalities over time. Some articles have concluded that national traffic
1 National Highway Safety Traffic Administration. Traffic Safety Facts 2004.
2 Leonard Evan’s Book, Traffic Safety, cites many examples o f traffic safety policies. Evans, L., 2004. 
Traffic Safety. Science Serving Society, Bloomfield Hills.
1
fatality rates tend to increase in initial industrialization phases, but later decrease as the 
country’s economy expands. For example, Kopits and Cropper (2005) showed that while 
per capita fatalities have been increasing considerably for developing countries, they have 
been decreasing for high-income nations. They found that fatality rates are likely to 
increase as a developing nation’s income increases due to an increase in the number of 
automobiles on the road. As income continues to grow, however, the fatality rate begins 
to fall because governments invest in better road infrastructure and individuals invest in 
safer cars.
Van Beeck, et al (2000) also examined the nonlinear relationship between traffic 
fatalities and economic growth over time. They found that traffic fatalities in 
industrialized nations have decreased as income has increased since the 1960’s. They 
partly attributed this reduction to declines in mobility growth (the per capita growth in 
vehicles). Mobility growth tends to increase rapidly at the onset of industrialization, but 
then it tends to level off. These findings were also echoed by Wang, et al’s (2003) time 
series analysis of economic growth and traffic fatalities in China. This study found that 
China, a newly developing country, has seen a rapid rise in the absolute number of traffic 
fatalities. They acknowledged that this was caused a 266-fold increase in the number of 
automobiles during the 1990’s, which occurred without corresponding updated 
infrastructure.
Similarly, Scuffham and Langley (2002) examined the time series relationship 
between real gross domestic product and traffic fatalities in New Zealand between 1970 
and 1994. They found real GDP per capita and automobile crashes to be negatively
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correlated. They believed that this trend was potentially caused by “supply side effects,” 
such as better road infrastructure.
There have also been some cross-sectional studies analyzing the impact of income 
on traffic fatalities. For instance, Peltzman (1975) showed that per capita traffic death 
rates were negatively correlated with disposable personal income among U.S. states. 
Moreover, he found that increased income, rather than increased safety regulation, was 
responsible for declines in traffic fatalities because the demand for vehicle safety features 
is greater at higher income levels. Hasselberg and Laflamme (2004) also found that 
Swedish children from families with higher disposable incomes were less likely to 
experience traffic accidents than their lower income counterparts. Likewise, Van Beeck, 
et al (1991) demonstrated that higher levels of income correspond to lower fatality rates 
among regions of the Netherlands.
The time-series impact of unemployment on traffic fatalities has also been 
examined, but the results have been mixed. For example, Wagenaar (1984) found the 
lagged unemployment rate and traffic fatalities to be positively correlated in a study 
which used monthly time series data for Michigan between 1972 and 1982. He believed 
this relationship was caused by the increased stress associated with negative economic 
conditions and unemployment. Schuffham (2003) analyzed the impact of the 
unemployment rate on quarterly traffic fatalities in New Zealand from 1970 to 1994. 
However, he found that reductions in unemployment (lagged one quarter) were 
associated with increases in the number of traffic fatalities. He believed this could be 
attributed to the reduction in vehicle miles traveled for both work and leisure associated 
with unemployment. It is unclear which of these factors is dominant.
3 Peltzman’s empirical model was specified to evaluate the impact o f safety regulations on fatality rates.
This study uses a cross-sectional approach for examining the relationship between 
economic conditions and traffic fatalities across the 50 United States. More specifically, 
this study examines the impact of per capita total income and state level unemployment 
rates upon fatalities per vehicle mile traveled. Traffic fatalities per vehicle mile traveled 
are believed to be a better measure than simply the number of fatalities because it 
controls for differences in driving distances. Traffic fatalities and their determinants are 
statistically modeled using averages of annual data for the years 1999 through 2003. This 
will help control for any anomalies that might have occurred in some states during a 
single year.4
The estimates presented herein support the hypothesis that economic conditions 
are indeed negatively associated with traffic fatalities across the 50 U.S. states. The 
following sections provide a detailed description of the econometric model, the data, and 
resulting estimates. The limitations of the analysis, suggestions for further research, and 
policy implications are also discussed.
MODEL
Economic conditions are likely to affect traffic fatality rates for several reasons. 
First, states with higher incomes should have better road infrastructure such as improved 
lighting and wider lanes. Those states are also more likely to have better equipment, 
resources, and employees for clearing snow and ice from roads. Furthermore, they 
should be able to have a larger police force to enforce traffic laws, thereby reducing the
4 An attempt was made to use panel data to estimate the model. However, this approach yielded poor 
goodness o f fit characteristics, possibly due to the spurious variation in single year state fatality rates.
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prevalence of unsafe driving. One reason for these increased expenditures is that states 
with better economic conditions should have a larger tax base. It is also expected that the 
demand for public safety should be greater at higher income levels if it is a normal good.5
Secondly, individuals should purchase more safety at higher income levels if 
safety is perceived as a normal good. Thus, individuals earning higher incomes are 
expected to purchase newer, safer cars. Johnson and Witt (1986) found that there was a 
significant positive correlation between new vehicle demand and personal disposable 
income. Increased income should also increase an individual’s demand for automobile 
safety features. For example, Boulding and Purohit (1996) showed that individuals are 
more willing to pay for airbags and antilock breaks when they have higher earning 
potentials. Additionally, individuals with higher incomes should be expected to exhibit 
more caution in driving and safety device use because they have more to lose if they are 
prevented from working due to an accident. Indeed, Blomquist (1979) found that 
individuals with higher expected future incomes were more likely to use safety belts.
Thirdly, more affluent regions are likely to have better medical facilities and 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS). These regions should have more highly trained 
physicians, nurses, and paramedic crews. Furthermore, newer and more advanced 
medical technologies and procedures are more likely to be found in prosperous regions. 
Better medical care is likely to reduce the number of fatalities seen in crash victims. 
Additionally, more emergency rooms in a region means shorter travel distances for traffic 
accident victims. This markedly increases their chance of survival. For instance, Noland 
(2003) found a significant inverse association between the number of doctors per capita 
and fatalities rates in OECD nations.
5 Pradhan and Ravallion’s empirical analysis showed that public safety was, in fact, a normal good (1999).
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The following econometric model was developed to evaluate the impact of 
income on traffic fatalities across states.
FRj= po + PiINCi+ p2URi + Sni=5 PjiXji +£;
The 1999-2003 average annual state traffic fatality rate is measured by FRj. This 
variable represents annual state fatalities per 1,000,000 vehicle miles traveled (VMT). 
Economic conditions at the state level are represented by two variables: the per capita 
total income in dollars (INC;) and the unemployment rate (URi). For the reasons stated 
earlier, if increased income does in fact reduce the fatality rate, the sign of Bi should be 
negative. The sign of the coefficient for the unemployment rate is expected to be positive 
because states with higher unemployment rates should yield a higher fatality rate.
The Xj variables represent the control factors that impact the state fatality rate. 
These factors include the alcohol consumption, speed limits, the percentage of teenage 
drivers, the relative strength of teenage driving laws, and state temperature.
Alcohol consumption (ALC) is measured by the 1999-2003 average annual 
ethanol alcohol consumption in gallons per capita. Alcohol consumption is likely to vary 
by state due to lifestyle differences or variations in religious or moral values. It is 
hypothesized that states with higher per capita alcohol consumption will have higher 
traffic fatality rates because alcohol consumption increases unsafe or reckless driving 
behavior. Alcohol can impair a person’s motor coordination skills, depth perception,
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vision, and judgment (CAMH). Therefore, the coefficient of ALC should have a 
positive sign.6
Traffic crashes are the leading public health threat for teenagers.7 Teenagers are 
more likely to be involved in fatal traffic crashes because they lack experience and 
maturity. They are not able to handle dangerous situations as well as more experienced 
drivers, and they may underestimate the impact of careless or reckless driving.8 
Therefore, it is likely that states with a higher proportion of teenagers drivers will have 
higher traffic fatality rates.
Largely because of the risks to teenage drivers, many states have restricted 
teenage driving. Teen driving laws vary substantively from state to state. The IIHS 
measured the strength of state teen driving laws using a 1-4 scale, with 4 meaning a 
state’s teen driving laws significantly restrict teen driving, while a 1 means that a state’s 
teen driving laws do not restrict teen driving. The following criteria were used to 
evaluate the laws: learner’s entry age, learner’s permit holding period, practice driving 
certification, nighttime driving restrictions, passenger restrictions, the presence of 
driver’s education, and the duration of the restriction period. These laws attempt to limit 
the distractions and/or extend driving practice times for teenage drivers, thereby 
promoting safer driving habits.
6 States with lower incomes or higher unemployment rates are more likely to have alcohol use rates. Ruhm 
(1995) found that increased in both alcohol consumption and traffic fatalities corresponded to lower income 
levels in the 48 contiguous states. Therefore, there is possibly of an interaction effect between alcohol 
consumption and economic conditions. However, an interaction variable was included to account for this 
effect, but it was found to be statistically insignificant. Thus, the interaction term was excluded from the 
final model.
7 Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2004
8 Jonah BA, and Dawson N., 1987. Youth and Risk: Age Differences in Risky Driving, Risk Perception, 
and Risk Utility. Alcohol, Drugs and Driving  3: 13-29.
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In order to estimate the impact of teenage driving on state traffic fatality rates, a 
variable that combined the number of teenage drivers and the relative strength of teen 
driving laws was produced. This variable (TEEN) is defined as:
TEEN = ((Teen Drivers/ Total Drivers) x 100)
IIHS Teen Driving Law Value
Thus, TEEN divides the percentage of drivers that are teenagers by the relative 
strength of the state’s teen driving laws in order to adjust for differences in the quality of 
teenage driving from state to state. The coefficient for TEEN is expected to be negative; 
having a larger percentage of teenage drivers and/ or weaker teenage driving laws should 
increase a state’s traffic fatality rate.
It is expected that states with higher speed limits will have more severe traffic 
crashes, and thus, more traffic fatalities. Additionally, most high-speed driving occurs on 
interstate highways. Therefore, the variable SPEEDMILE was included to control for 
differences in interstate speed limits and the frequency of travel on interstate roads. 
SPEEDMILE is the percentage of each state’s total miles driven on interstate highways, 
weighted by the mileage and speed limit differentials for urban versus rural highways.
SPEEDMILE= (Urban Speedmile9 + Rural Speedmile10)/ Total Miles Driven
9 Urban Speedmile = (Urban Interstate Speed Limit x Urban Interstate VMT) x (Urban Interstate VMT/ 
Total VMT)
10 Rural Speedmile = (Rural Interstate Speed Limit x Rural Interstate VMT) x (Rural Interstate VMT/ Total 
VMT)
The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive, since driving more miles at 
higher speeds is likely to yield a higher traffic fatality rate.
A variable was also included to control for differences in state temperatures. All 
other factors equal, states with lower average annual temperatures should expect less 
traffic fatalities than states with higher average temperatures. This idea was empirically 
established by Koshal (1976), Zlatoper (1987), and Zlatoper (1991). In states with 
higher temperatures, drivers are likely to be less comfortable, and therefore, have poorer 
performance. Hot temperatures are also linked to higher levels of driver aggression11. 
Driver aggression or road rage causes drivers to engage in risky driving behaviors, which
causes more traffic crashes. Finally, states with colder temperatures typically have more
12snowfall, which slows driving spends and reduces fatalities.
For this study, temperature was measured by the variable DEGREEDAYS.
This variable was calculated by subtracting the annual population-weighted cooling 
degree days13 from the annual population-weighted heating degree days.14 Thus, states 
with lower average annual temperatures have a higher value for this variable. As a result, 
the coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative.
Finally, a dummy variable, UTAH, was included for the state of Utah. Utah was 
an outlier in this analysis, as it had a low fatality rate and a relatively low per capita 
income for each of the five years examined. Thus, the coefficient for UTAH is likely to 
be negative.
11 Kenrick and MacFarlane (1986), for instance, recorded the number o f times cars honked their horns at a 
car stopped at a green light at various temperatures. They found a direct linear relationship between 
temperature and the number of honks.
12 Snowfall is not measured by state. Therefore, it could not be included in the model. Evans (2004) 
examines regional differences in snowfall and its effect on fatality rates.
13 Xn i=365 (Mean daily temperature- 65 degrees Fahrenheit)
14 2" j=365 (65 degrees Fahrenheit -  mean daily temperature)
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In order to determine the aggregate effect of income on traffic fatalities, variables 
related to the state healthcare expenditures and the size of the police force were purposely 
excluded from the model. Although these factors are likely to impact the number of 
traffic fatalities in a state, they were primarily functions of state economic conditions.
For instance, Jacobs and Helms (1997) found that there was a direct relationship between 
the tax base, as measured by GDP per capita, and police force strength. Similarly, 
Newhouse (1977) showed that over 90 percent of country-level cross-sectional 
differences in per capita medical expenditures could be explained by differences in per 
capita incomes. Thus, in order to examine the total effect that income has on traffic 
fatalities, these variables were excluded from the model.
DATA
State data was collected for the years 1999-2003. Yearly observations were then 
averaged to produce one observation per state for each variable. Calculating five year 
averages reduces the possibility of spurious outliers, thus providing a more accurate 
representation of typical state conditions. All fifty states were included.
State traffic fatality totals were produced by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation. State total per capita income data was calculated by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, and state unemployment rates were published by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. State per capita alcohol consumption data was calculated by the 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, an agency of the National Institutes 
of Health. Data regarding state vehicle-miles traveled by functional system was
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produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration. 
State speed limits and teen driving laws were provided by the Insurance Institute of 
Highway Safety. State heating and cooling degree days were computed by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Finally, data regarding the number of teen and 
total licensed drivers was produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation. Teenage 
drivers were recognized as those 19 years of age and younger.
The descriptive statistics of the data are included in Appendix A. The mean 
fatality rate is 0.01573 crash fatalities per million vehicle miles traveled annually. State 
traffic fatality rates ranged from 0.0085290 per million annual vehicles miles traveled 
(Massachusetts) to 0.0241931 per million vehicle miles traveled (Mississippi). State 
income per capita ranged from $22,134.00 (Mississippi) to $42,267.00 (Connecticut), 
with an average of $29,359.46. State unemployment rates ranged from 6.8 percent 
(Alaska) to 3.2 percent (North Dakota and South Dakota), with an average of 4.738 
percent.
Ethanol alcohol consumption ranges from 1.08 gallons per capita (Utah) to 3.35 
gallons per capita (New Hampshire). The mean value of per capita alcohol consumption 
is 1.8902 gallons. Hawaii has the smallest value (-3,522) for DEGREED AYS, since it 
did not have any heating degree days. Predictably, Alaska had the largest value for 
DEGREED AYS (10,373). The average value for DEGREED AYS is 3997.86, which 
most closely approximates the climates of states such as Maryland, West Virginia, 
Missouri, and New Jersey.15
15 Data regarding state DUI laws and penalties, seat belt laws and penalties, nighttime driving speed limit 
differentials, average annual precipitation, urban to rural driving ratios, and population density were 
collected, but were found to be statistically insignificant when included in the empirically estimated model. 
Therefore, these variables were excluded from the model.
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ESTIMATES
The model was empirically estimated using ordinary least squares. The estimates 
are summarized in Appendix B. The results indicate that state level economic conditions 
significantly impact the traffic fatality rate. More specifically, a 1,000 dollar increase in 
the per capita state GDP decreases state traffic fatalities by 0.000542 per million vehicle 
miles traveled, on average. Similarly, a one percentage point decrease in the state 
unemployment rate leads to 0.00113 fewer traffic accidents per million vehicle miles 
traveled, on average.
The parameter estimates are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level 
for two-tailed tests. All of the parameter estimates also have the expected signs as 
determined by the previous theoretical discussion. The regression results show that a one 
gallon increase in per capita ethanol alcohol consumption causes the traffic fatality rate to 
increase by 0.00222, ceteris paribus. States with a higher ratio of teen to total drivers 
and/or less strict teen driving laws also experience more traffic fatalities per vehicle mile 
traveled. In fact, a one percentage point in the number of teen drivers, adjusted for 
differences in teen driving laws, increases state traffic fatalities by 0.00111 per million 
vehicle miles driven.
Increases in interstate speed limits or the frequency of travel on interstate roads 
also significantly increases state traffic fatality rates. A one unit increase in 
SPEEDMILE increases traffic fatalities per by 0.00106 for every one million vehicle 
miles driven. Furthermore, as expected, states with warmer temperatures experience more 
traffic fatalities than states with cooler climates. The regression results indicate that a
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100 degree increase in net degree days decreases the traffic fatality rate by .000033.16 
Finally, there are -0.00551 fewer traffic fatalities per million vehicle miles traveled in 
Utah, with other factors held constant.
The model’s goodness-of-fit measures are fairly strong for a cross-sectional 
analysis. The R2 value is 0.7421, indicating that the model explains 74.21 percent of the 
variation in the traffic fatality rates across the states. Furthermore, the model shows no 
signs of multicollinearity. There is also no evidence of heteroskedasticity, as determined 
by the White’s Test for heteroskedasticity.17 Thus, the model is statistically valid and 
appears to adequately represent the determinants of traffic fatalities.
DISCUSION
This analysis shows that economic conditions do in fact influence cross-sectional 
state level fatalities per vehicle mile traveled, after controlling for several demographic, 
policy, and geographic factors also linked to traffic fatalities. States with higher per 
capita income levels and lower unemployment rates should see fewer traffic fatalities, 
ceteris paribus.
It is important to remember that this study does not address the time series impact 
of economic conditions on traffic fatalities. Therefore, it is not possible to determine any 
lagged effects of the independent variables. However, cross-sectional estimates may be 
useful to Federal and state policymakers that wish to reduce fatality rates because they 
present a more general analysis of the determinants of fatality rates. Nevertheless, future
16 A 100 increase in net degree days could mean 100 days out o f the year with temperatures decreased by 1
degree Fahrenheit, for example.
17 The White’s Test Statistic is equal to 0.414.
researchers might consider using panel data to view time series and cross-sectional 
effects simultaneously
In order to reduce fatality rates, policy makers at both the federal and state levels 
should consider economic conditions when budgeting for goods and services such as road 
infrastructure, law enforcement, and medical services. For instance, if a less affluent 
jurisdiction’s goal is to decrease traffic fatalities, perhaps a higher percentage of that 
jurisdiction’s tax revenue should be used for these goods. Additionally, poorer states 
might consider adopting stricter teen driving/ licensing laws or increasing expenditures 
for alcohol awareness programs in order to compensate for low levels of income or high 
unemployment rates. Federal policy makers might also consider giving states larger 
grants to spend on road infrastructure and traffic safety. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this analysis to determine which of these goods or services is most important for 
reducing traffic fatalities. Additional research should be conducted in this area.
There are three main limitations associated with this analysis. First, economic 
conditions may vary significantly among counties or regions within states. However, this 
study does not account for intrastate differences in economic conditions. Secondly, this 
study only measures the fatalities associated with traffic crashes. Since it neglects non- 
fatal crashes, it may not capture the total impact of economic conditions on overall traffic 
safety. Further research should be conducted to determine if better economic conditions 
reduce all traffic crashes. Finally, this model is unable to account for time series affects. 
Therefore, it cannot be used to determine the relationship between economic conditions 
and traffic fatality rates overtime.
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APPENDIX A 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std Dev
FR 0.01573 0.00397
INC 29,359 4280
UR 4.738 .86210
ALC 1.89020 0.37286
TEEN 1.96361 0.97485
SPEEDMILE 2.42172 1.02439
DEGREEDAYS 3997.86 2978.15
15
APPENDIX B 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard E rror T-Stiatistic
Intercept 0.01880 0.00456 4,12
INC -5.42479E-7 1.039687E-7 -5.22
UR 0.00113 0.00039456 2.87
ALC 0.00222 0.00093137 2.38
TEEN 0.00111 0.00042690 2.60
SPEEDMILE 0.00106 0.00033686 3.13
DEGREEDAYS -3.31679E-7 1.153819E-7 -2.87
UTAH -0.00551 0.00243 -2.27
N= 50
R2 = 0.7421
Root MSE = 0.00218
16
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